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Since 1999, China has spent RMB 50 billion (about US$7 billion) to implement the 
‘Grain for Green’ programme, the largest land retirement programme in the developing 
world. From 1999 to 2003, over 7.2 million hectares of agricultural land were retired 
under the programme. However, many farmers report that they did not receive the 
compensation promised under the programme in exchange for planting trees on their 
agricultural land. This paper examines the impacts of subsidy payment shortfalls, 
delayed payments and programme uncertainty on farmers’ participation in the Grain for 
Green programme. A stylized reputation game is used to explain how village-level 
corruption (subsidy underpayment), along with uncertainty regarding the likely 
longevity of the programme, discourage farmers’ participation in the programme. Panel 
data are used to estimate the impact of previous payment shortfalls on subsequent … 
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land conversion. A strong negative impact is found. Village level payment information 
is used to identify the impact on programme participation of both corruption and 
uncertainty regarding the programme’s longevity. Further investigation reveals that 
variation in both payment receipt and programme participation appear to be driven by 
household specific characteristics, such as being a Communist Party member or 
working for the local government. These results provide useful guidance on how to 




Figures and tables are at the end of the study. 
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1 Introduction 
Investors’ future expectations are based upon previous experiences. Thus the reputations of 
participants in a contractual arrangement greatly influences their willingness to engage in 
possibly risky investments. If the legal infrastructure is incomplete or imperfect, as is often 
the case in developing countries, government agencies usually have more control on contract 
enforcement. Individuals holding contracts with the government sometimes find that the 
government does not honour them. In this situation, the reputation of the institutions 
administering government contracts can have a large impact on contract outcomes.  
 
It is difficult to measure people’s perceptions of their government’s reputation, so there is 
relatively little direct evidence on the quantitative impact of government reputation on the 
success of public project implementation in developing countries. This paper examines the 
effect of reputation, in terms of both village level corruption and central policy design, using 
China’s ‘Grain for Green’ programme as a case study. More specifically, this study examines 
the following questions: (1) Do previous government payment shortfalls discourage 
subsequent conversion of farm land into forest under this programme? (2) Does future 
uncertainty about whether the programme will be extended help explain changes in farmers’ 
participation behaviour over time? And (3) how are the programme benefits distributed 
across different social groups, and how does the distribution of the subsidy affect farmers’ 
participation? 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Grain for Green 
programme and reviews some recent literature on that programme. Section 3 lays out a 
theoretical model of the reputation formation process to explain how village-level corruption 
(subsidy underpayment), along with uncertainty regarding the likely longevity of the 
programme, jointly discourage farmers’ participation in the programme. Section 4 describes 
the GFG household survey data and presents some descriptive evidence that strongly suggests 
a link between previous subsidy underpayment and subsequent programme participation. 
Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, and the final section summarizes the results and 
presents suggestions for future research. 
2  China’s ‘Grain for Green’ Programme 
In general, land use policy affects both environmental quality and economic development in 
rural areas of developing countries (Deacon 1995; Deininger and Minten 1999). Yet 
development and conservation goals are often in conflict, and China demonstrates this 
dilemma. China became the world’s fastest growing economy after economic reforms were 
introduced in the early 1980s. However, this tremendous economic development has been 
accompanied by both significant environmental degradation and persistent pockets of rural 
poverty.  
 
China’s increasing population, and its growing disposable income, have increased its demand 
for grain, which exerts pressure on all natural resources, especially land. In addition to 
deforestation, intensive cultivation practices on agricultural land have increased soil erosion, 
often due to applying too much fertilizer on land that is only marginally suitable for   2
cultivation. Soil erosion in China occurs mostly in its western provinces, which are the source 
of both the Yellow and the Yangtze Rivers. One year after devastating floods along the 
Yangtze River, China’s central government initiated a land set-aside programme, known as 
‘Sloping Land Conservation Programme’ or ‘Grain for Green’ (GFG) Programme. 
 
To encourage local farmers to participate in the programme, China’s government 
implemented an incentive scheme that gives farmers grain, cash payments and tree seedlings 
for converting their cropland to forest land. The grain subsidy varies from 1,500 to 2,250 
kilograms per annum for each hectare of converted farmland, which has a market value of 
RMB2100 (US$260) to RMB3150 (US$390). The annual cash subsidy is RMB300 (US$40) 
for each hectare of converted farmland. On average, the total value of the compensation is 
over RMB3000 per year (Uchida et al. 2005). In addition to grain and cash payments, free 
tree seedlings are provided to participating households. The duration of the subsidies is as 
follows: eight years for converting farmland into ecologically protected forest;
1 five years for 
conversion of farmland into economic forest;
2 and two years for converting farmland into 
grassland. During these periods farmers must continue their reforestation efforts, under the 
leadership of their local government (village, county, or township). 
 
Besides the direct environmental and ecological benefits, the GFG programme was designed 
to reduce rural poverty. China has more than six million hectares of farmland with a slope of 
over 25 degrees. The project was designed to convert cultivated land on slopes of 25 degrees 
or more to forestland in order to reduce cultivation of steeply sloped land. Sloped cropland 
usually has a limited water supply and low fertility, and high rates of soil erosion lead to low, 
unstable grain yields. The upstream area along the Yangtze is known for its underdeveloped 
economy and fragile environment, so the programme should have been attractive to most 
farmers in that area.  
 
Although many programmes attempt to combine economic development with conservation 
goals, conservation projects in developing countries have had less impact than expected. 
Problems with China’s ‘Grain for Green’ programme include inconsistent and unstable policy 
planning, and inadequate and irregular compensation payments. The policy clearly states that 
people who convert their croplands should plant trees, and those who manage the forests 
should benefit, but there have been several problems regarding compensation.  
 
Several studies report that the GFG compensation payments either failed to materialize or 
were only partially paid. Xu and Cao (2001) examined a group of 1,026 participating 
households from the Shannxi, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces and found that 49.5 per cent had 
received only partial compensation. Among these partial payment recipients, 8.5 per cent had 
received only the grain subsidy, and 17.6 per cent had received no compensation at all up to 
the time of the survey (in 1999). Furthermore, grain payments have often involved poor 
quality grain. Xu et al. (2010) document that significant compensation  shortfalls were still 
occurring in 2003. On average, only about 49 per cent of the grain subsidy and 23 per cent of 
the cash subsidy had been received by the programme participants. Moreover, Xu et al. point 
out that the shortfalls do not appear to be the result of programme lag time or sanctions due to 
poor implementation; some counties that had the maximum average subsidy shortfall also had 
the highest average tree seedling survival rates in the sample (the tree seedling survival rate is 
the main qualifying criteria for receiving subsidies). They also discuss possible reasons for 
                                                 
1 Growing these types of the trees is done mainly to reduce soil erosion. 
2 These trees have economic values, such as fruit trees, timber, etc.   3
payment shortfalls, including local government reallocation of subsidies for other uses, and 
delays in payments due to insufficient implementation capability.  
 
Grosjean and Kontoleon (2007) use different data (from Ningxia and Guizhou provinces) to 
analyse farmers’ contingent post-programme land and labour decisions. Their empirical 
analysis includes a dummy variable, ‘subsidy assurance’, that measures whether households 
receive the programme subsidies in a timely and consistent manner. Their results reveal that 
the likelihood of re-enrollment is affected not just by the subsidy amount but also by the 
implementation assurances offered to farmers. In particular, they found that the subsidy 
assurance affects participation more in geographic areas where farmers have fewer off-farm 
opportunities. 
 
China’s GFG programme is a typical ‘government payments for environmental services’ 
programme (Wunder et al. 2008).3 For historical reasons, as well as current land policies such 
as tenure insecurity and frequent government land redistribution efforts, farmers fear that 
there will be changes to the GFG programme. For example, according to one internal 
government report (China Forest Department report 2005), there was a sudden reduction in 
the size of the programme target in 2003 and 2004, which led to a large number of unpaid 
subsidies. Whether the programme will be continued and expanded nationwide depends on 
the success of the current pilot programme, which has been implemented only on a small 
scale. The data used for this study were taken from the three provinces—Shannxi, Gansu, 
Sichuan—that participated in the initial pilot programme. 
 
As discussed in Bennett and Xu (2008) and Zuo (2001), both the land retirement and subsidy 
distribution processes of the GFG programme have been conducted using a top-down 
approach, where the central government distributes funds to the provinces, which then funnel 
funds and grain to counties, townships, and finally to villages. This process makes it easy for 
corrupt government officials at several administrative levels to divert GFG funds to other 
purposes, and it also implies that farmers may have difficulties making long-term land use 
decisions because of delays in the programme’s implementation. Xu et al. (2010) explain that 
one reason for the delays is that the programme expanded so fast that local government 
agencies have not been able to check whether the converted land satisfies programme 
requirements (such as tree survival rates). Delays in certifying converted plots at the village 
level leads to reporting delays to the next level of administration, which resulted in top-level 
mistargetting and inconsistent programme planning. If previously converted land is not 
certified by spring, when farmers have to make their planting decisions, they will be more 
reluctant to participate. 
 
Corruption and rent-seeking behaviour occurs not only in environment related projects 
(Barbier et al. 2005; Bulte et al. 2007), but also in other public programmes in developing 
countries. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) examined public expenditure on education in 
Uganda; they found that, on average, local schools received only 13 per cent of the grants that 
had been awarded, with most schools receiving nothing. This paper not only measures the 
magnitude of ‘local capture,’ but also measures for China’s GFG programme the impact of 
local capture on the land conversion rate, a direct programme objective.  
                                                 
3 Government-financed programmes often start as pilot programmes, followed by an expansion. Thereafter the 
size of these programmes tends to change with annual budget allocations, which cause policy inconsistency and 
payment uncertainty.   4
3 The  model 
This section presents a model of the GFG programme based on the reputation model of Kreps 
and Wilson (1982). The model analyses the strategic interactions between governments and 
farmers in a dynamic setting. Two features are added to the original model: (i) a partial 
payment parameter that separates participants, to show that favoured groups are more likely 
to participate in the programme; and (ii) a probability factor that measures the future 
longevity of the programme, to assess whether policy uncertainty discourages farmer’s 
participation. 
 
Consider a simple model with two players: a farmer ( ) F  and a local government ( ). G  In 
each period, the farmer chooses whether to participate in the programme and the local 
government decides whether to issue subsidy payments. Local governments can be ‘honest’ 
(H-type) or ‘opportunistic’ (O-type). Farmers update beliefs about the local government, 
based on previous payment history, and then decide whether to participate. The timing of the 
model is as follows: 
 
(1) In Period 0, nature determines player G’s type i, which can be eitherH orO . Player F has 
an initial probability distribution over player G’s type: pr(i = H) = β1; pr(i = O) = 1- β1.  
 
(2) In each period (t=1, 2, ...T), player F decides whether to participate. Let  t q  be the 
probability that player F participates in period t. If player F chooses ‘participate’, then player 
G decides whether to pay the full announced programme compensation (C) for participation. 
Let γi,t be the probability of ‘pay’ at time t for type i. If player G chooses γi,t = 1, the full 
subsidy S is issued. If  γi,t = 0, player G pays only part of the subsidy, δS, with  1 0 < ≤δ  and 
keeps the rest for itself. If player F declines to participate, she receives the agricultural 
production payoff, πa. 
 
(3) At the end of each period, by observing player G’s choice, γi,t, player F updates her belief, 
βt+1.  
 
(4) The game has two variants. In one, the game ends at period T, and both players know this. 
In the other, the game ends at period T with probability α and at period T+1 with probability 
1-α. The matrix below shows the payoffs corresponding to each strategy for the two types of 
player G: 
0 , 0 , e participat not 
, , e participat
cheat pay                     F  
a a




δ −  
0 , 0 , e participat not 
) 1 ( , , e participat
cheat pay                     F  
a a




δ δ −   
Player G’s payoff consists of a monetary part, the direct economic benefit from implementing 
the programme, and a non-monetary part related to local farmers’ public trust and to 
evaluation of player G’s institutional performance by the upper level administration. Assume   5
that both types of player G receive both the monetary and non-monetary parts as their 
payoffs. The distinction between the H-type and the O-type is the difference in local 
government preferences over the monetary and non-monetary parts. An H-type truly cares 
about farmers and/or is punished for breaking promises; in either case the non-monetary part 
is more important for the H-type. An O-type, on the other hand, puts more or all of the weight 
on the monetary part and captures as much as it can from the project for its own pocket. 
Therefore, the payoffs for both types to play the ‘cheat’ strategy are weighted sums of these 
two parts.  
 
The model assumes that both player G types get a positive C  if they follow the rules and pay 
the full subsidy to player F, although the meaning of getting that benefit may differ for them. 
Also, both player Gs suffer a cost, -C, of a lower reputation if they play a ‘cheat’ strategy, in 
exchange for an immediate benefit of (1 – δ)S. Again, H-types care only about reputation and 
ignore everything else, so the payoff for H-types from cheating is simply  C − . In contrast, O-
types will get (1 – δ)S by cheating, because they value only the monetary benefit. 
 
The model also assumes that δπ ≤ πa≤ S; in a full information world, where farmers know the 
type of local government they are dealing with, a farmer who plays with an H-type will 
choose ‘participate’, and a farmer who plays with an O-type will choose ‘not participate’. 
Moreover, if 0 < C ≤ (1 – δ)S, then an O-type prefers to cheat and an H-type prefers a ‘pay’ 
strategy. 
3.1  The case without uncertainty about programme length  
To begin, consider the situation without uncertainty regarding the longevity of the 
programme, which means that both players know that the game will end at period T. 
 




− ≥ 1 1
S
a
, there exists 
a pure-strategy pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
4 which consists of the 
following: 
 i) for t=1,...,T-1, player G’s strategies are  ; 1 , , = = t O t H γ γ   




iii) player F’s strategy is the following: 1 ) 0 ( = > t t q β ; and  0 ) 0 ( = = t t q β  for t=1,..., T; 
iv) a separating strategy at period T is:  1 , = T H γ  and  . 0 , = T O γ  







then an O-type player G can mimic H-types and play γO,t = γH,t = 
1 until period T and play γO,t = 0 to get maximize the payoff (since player F will play qT = 1 
if βT = β1). 
 
                                                 
4 Kreps and Wilson (1982)   6
Now consider what happens if the prior belief is not high enough to guarantee participation in 




− < 1 1
S
a
, if the O-type does not do something to enhance player F’s 
belief, so that  1 β β = T , then player F will not participate in period T and O-type will lose the 
chance to play ‘cheat’ in the last period. Intuitively, playing with skeptical player Fs, an O-
type has to play more strategically to convince player F to participate.  
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Proof: both proofs of proposition 1 and 2 are straightforward and directly from Kreps and 
Wilson (1982).  
 
In short, the probability that player F believes that player G is an H-type is a function of how 
the game has been played up to period t, (i.e. βt+1(γt)). Farmers then decide whether to 
participate, depending upon the expected payoff, as determined by the updated belief (i.e. 
qt+1(βt+1)). 
 
The partial payment parameter, δt, accounts for exogenous factors that determine how much 
an O-type government would pay of the total contract amount. For example, farmers who 
have close ties to the local administration may be paid more than others. Farmers’ responses 
will depend on how they have been treated previously, and their view of the probability that 
the government will pay. Note that both the mixed strategy probability and the threshold of 
playing ‘participate’ depend on δ. Simple calculation shows that the participation probability 
is a decreasing function of  . δ   Thus if player G chooses to pay more to a specific group than 
to others (i.e. δ1 > δ2), the threshold probability for this favoured group will be lower. 
Therefore, the favoured group is more likely to participate in the programme. 
3.2  The case with uncertainty about programme length 
In the standard reputation model the players know when the game will end. In reality, 
however, this is not always true. For the ‘Grain for Green’ programme, the central 
government periodically changes the size of the programme, which typically reflects the 
annual government budget. Moreover, the GFG programme started in 1999 as a pilot 
(experimental) project. In 2003 the central government debated whether to expand the 
programme to the whole country or end it. The decision was based on programme evaluations 
conducted during the pilot phase. Thus, during this phase neither the local government nor 
the individual farmers knew whether the programme would be extended, which created 
uncertainty about the end date of the programme.  
 
To account for this uncertainty about the programme’s end date in a relatively simple way, 
the original reputation model can be extended by assuming that there are either two or three 
periods. There are two variations of the model depending on the timing of the announcement   7
of whether there will be a third period. In one variant this announcement is made before 
player F decides whether to participate in period 3. In the other, the announcement is made 
after player F makes that participation decision. While the likelihood of having a third period 
determines player F’s participation threshold, the equilibria under ‘early announcement’ are 




D be the probability that the programme has only two periods, and 1 - α
D be the 
probability that it will be extended to a third period. Also assume that (1 - α
D)S ≥ πa ≥ δS ≥ (1 
- α
D)δS, otherwise the payoffs and the rules of the game are the same as in the previous case. 
The announcement about whether the game will continue to a third period is made after 
player F decides whether to participate in period 3. If there is no third period, the game ends 
after player F’s move with zero payoffs for both players in period 3. If there is a third period, 
then after the announcement, player G will decide to ‘pay’ or ‘cheat’. The payoffs and rules 








Whether a pure-strategy pooling PBE (where player G pooled on ‘pay’ for the first two 
periods and separate in the last period) exists depends on player F’s prior belief of the 
likelihood of having a third period. The condition for player F to choose ‘participate’ in 
period 3 is:  
(1 – α
D)(Sβ3
D + δS(1 – β3
D)) > πa. Assuming that the farmer will participate in period 3, the 
condition for an O-type government to choose ‘pay’ at the second period is: C + (1 - α
D)(1 - 
δ)S > (1 – δ)S.  
 
Once all the payoffs and the probability meet the pooling equilibrium conditions, the 
structure and details of the pooling PBE are similar to Proposition 1. Therefore, focus on a 
more interesting situation where the prior belief is not high enough to guarantee that player F 
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D , and the probability of having a third 
period is sufficiently high  S
C D
) 1 ( 1 1 δ α − − > − , there exists a mixed-strategy (hybrid) PBE.  
Proof: (for the details and the proof, see Appendix 1) 
Consider how the uncertainty factor α
D plays a role in the equilibrium with a ‘delayed 
announcement’. First, the minimum belief required for player F to play ‘participate’ in each 
period, βt
D*, for t=1, 2, 3, are all decreasing functions of 
D α − 1 . This implies that the higher 
the probability of having a third period, the lower the belief threshold required for player F to 
enter the game, and the later she switches to a mixed strategy. Because both players know α
D 
and βt
D*, with a higher 
D α − 1a n d  l o w e r
∗ D
t β , the farmer knows that it will be less likely for 
the O-type government to play ‘cheat’ and therefore, the farmer will play pure strategy 
‘participate’ longer.  
   8
Second, the mixed-strategy probabilities for the O-type to pay in both periods 1 and 2 are 
increasing functions of 
D α − 1 . This means that if the expectation of having a third period is 
low, an O-type player G is more likely to pay in the earlier periods. In particular, for  , 2 ,
∗ D
O γ  
when 0 =
D α , the result converts to the standard reputation model without uncertainty that 
has been discussed in the first part for T=3 (Similarly for α
D = 1, it will be the same with just 
two periods). 
 
From the farmers’ perspective, both the uncertainty factor, 1 - α
D, and the partial payment 
factor, δ, will raise the participation belief threshold and influence the equilibrium in a similar 
fashion that discourages their incentive to participate. However, from an O-type player G’s 
point of view, these two factors can have opposite effects. An O-type government will benefit 
from a higher − 1 δ , but will suffer from a higher α
D in the same way as player F will. In other 
words, player G does not have any control on α
D, which explains why the uncertainty factor 
enters in the O-type’s mixed-strategy probability.  
 
In sum, in a world that has both uncertain information regarding the type of the player G and 
the future of the programme, to participate in the programme, player F needs a sufficiently 
high belief to overcome three types of risks: 1) the risk of facing an O-type player; 2) the risk 
of losing the reservation income ‘πa’ due to the ‘delayed announcement’; and 3) the risk that 
an O-type player G will cheat even earlier due to the fear that the game will end too soon, so 
that he or she is unable to cheat in the future. 
3.3 Discussion 
The above model attempts to capture two different issues that could discourage farmers’ 
participation in the programme. The first is village-level corruption, where the local 
government does not pay farmers all that they are entitled. The second issue is problematic 
programme planning where the central government may cancel or re-target the programme. 
Both will cause farmers to be under-subsidized, but through different mechanisms.  
 
Note that the current model assumes that farmers pay no additional cost to reconvert forest 
land back to agricultural use if they decide to drop out of the programme in later periods. In 
reality, however, farmers must pay various costs for reconversion, such as the extra labour 
costs of cutting down trees, cleaning up, ploughing and sowing land to prepare for raising 
crops in the next growing season. If player F incurs a cost to return land to cultivation, his or 
her actual payoff from choosing to participate but then being cheated will be less than δS. In 
other words, the payoff to player F from initially choosing not to participate is higher than πa. 
Given the above discussion, the probability that player F will enter must be adjusted in such a 
way that, the higher the switching cost is, the earlier player F will switch to the mixed-
strategy and the less likely he or she chooses ‘participate’ in later periods. The model also 
simplifies the costs that farmers pay to participate in the programme, such as purchases of 
tree seedlings, the labour cost of planting trees, and the cost of technical support to improve 
seedlings’ survival rate. All these costs will further reduce farmers’ incentive to participate.  
 
In sum, modifying the reputation model to allow for both heterogeneity in programme 
participants and future uncertainty yields the following predictions: (1) Previous subsidy 
shortfall reduce current programme participation. (2) If an O-type government discriminates 
among farmers based on their specific characteristics, the favoured group should have a   9
relatively high participation rate.
5 (3) Greater uncertainty about the end date of the 
programme reduces farmers’ participation.  
4  Data and descriptive analysis 
The data used for the empirical analysis in this paper are from a two year panel data set 
collected in China in 2003 and 2005 by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, the 
Institute of Geographical Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. During the second 
round of data collection in 2005, the survey included questions to collect recall information 
for the year 1999. The data were obtained from a stratified random sample of households in 
rural areas of China where the ‘Grain for Green’ programme had been implemented. The 
final data set has 348 households, of which 266 participated in the programme, from 40 
randomly selected villages in 18 townships, 6 counties and 3 provinces: Shaanxi, Gansu and 
Sichuan (Uchida et al. 2005).  
 
The household questionnaire was similar to those of the World Bank’s Living Standard 
Measurement Study surveys, with detailed questions on many household characteristics and 
activities, including land transactions, agricultural production, and household members’ 
demographic in-formation. The survey also asked participants and non-participants their 
perceptions of the programme, the sizes of plots they converted, the compensation amounts 
listed on the contract, actual compensation received, and the future plans of participating 
farmers after the programme ended. 
4.1 Data  construction 
‘Underpayment amount’ is the most important variable used in the regression analysis. It is 
defined, for each year after a farmer converted land, as the difference between the subsidy the 
farmers actually received and the subsidy the farmer was entitled to receive as specified by 
the formula set by the central government. Villages have different payment schedules that 
depend on several factors, including the date when the local government received programme 
payments from higher levels of government, the timing of the certification process, and local 
government efficiency. In some villages, farmers received the subsidy the same year they 
converted land, while in others farmers had to wait until the following year. 
 
However, this definition of underpayment suffers from a potentially serious shortcoming: it 
does not distinguish between underpayment and delayed payment. The difference in any 
given year between the payment received and the contractual amount could include both 
receipt of a delayed payment due in a previous year and shortfall in the current payment. 
Unfortunately, the data available do not distinguish between delayed payments and payments 
                                                 
5 However, farmers could have different perspectives, which could reflect the same characteristics that 
determine their payment priority. For example, the farmers who are favoured by the local government, and so 
get paid more, may also have more information or confidence about the future of the programme. In this case, 
the game could be more complicated, because an O-type G could take advantage of the group’s future 
confidence by paying them less without losing this group’s participation and pay more to the other farmers to 
raise their participation. In this sense, the parameter δ  could be endogenously determined by the O-type 
government depending on the sizes of these two effects and the relative proportion of the two groups. While this 
could be an interesting extension of the model, due to limited empirical data, we defer this issue to future 
research.   10
of current obligations. Since both delayed payment and underpayment may affect farmers’ 
behaviour, the impact of the underpayment variable is, in effect, a weighted average of the 
impacts of these two phenomena. 
 
The first task in calculating underpayment was to construct a variable that measures the 
contract payment amount, the cash and/or grain payments that the contract specifies to be 
delivered to the household, based on the amount of the land converted from crop land to 
forest or grassland. Each household reported both payments stipulated by the contract and 
‘realized’ payments for 2003 and 2004, but for earlier years only the ‘realized payment’ was 
collected. Therefore, to calculate the underpayment from 1999 to 2002 one must infer the 
contract amount. For each year, the data include the amount of land converted to ecological 
forest, economic forest or grassland, which allows one to calculate the subsidy payment 
based on programme rules, which were announced by the central government.
6 The annual 




To check this approximation, Table 1 shows the correlation between the constructed ‘contract 
amount’ and the self-reported ‘contract amount’ as well as the correlation between 
constructed and self-reported underpayment for 2003 and 2004. Except for the grain subsidy 
in 2004, the correlation between the approximation and the survey data ranges from 0.44 to 
0.80. Since the self-reported data may also be measurement with error, the constructed 
underpayment variable appears to be a reasonable approximation of the true value.  
 
Table 2 shows the number of households that were underpaid (positive underpayment 
amount) and the number that were overpaid (negative underpayment amount) in each year of 
the panel. It is very unlikely that the government would overpay the participants, so the only 
explanation is that the previous subsidy payment was delayed, which led to the 
‘overpayment’ in subsequent years. Thus observation of overpayments indicates previously 
promised, but delayed, payments. It is not surprising that the percentage of overpaid 
households rises over time, from 1 per cent in 1999 to 30 per cent in 2004, in Table 2.
8  
 
This information can also be used to construct ‘accumulated underpayment amount’, the 
accumulated sum of the difference between payment stipulated by the contract and the 
realized payment over time, to better measure the effect of underpayment. If observed 
underpayments reflect both delayed payments that are repaid in later years underpayments 
that are never repaid, the accumulated underpayment variable will increasingly reflect only 
the latter as time passes. Thus the empirical analysis in the next section examines not only the 
effect of the ‘annual underpayment amount’ but also the effect of the ‘accumulated 
underpayment amount’, since the latter is less influenced by delayed payments as time 
passes. 
                                                 
6 See Uchida et al. (2005) 
7 Delayed payments imply that the underpayment amounts could be negative if last year’s payment is paid this 
year. 
8 Some villages started the programme earlier than 1999 which causes the overpayment in 1999.   11
4.2 Descriptive  evidence 
This subsection presents basic descriptive statistics relevant to the analyses presented in the 
following subsections. Figure 1 shows newly converted land as a percentage of households’ 
total convertible agricultural land (excluding land converted in previous years). On average, 
about 10-15 per cent of current convertible land is converted each year, and this percentage 
decreases over time. This decreasing trend is consistent with the model’s prediction that the 
probability of a farmer’s participation declines over time. However, there are two other 
possible reasons for this decreasing trend: 1) farmers are likely to first convert their lowest 
quality land, and will stop participating when they reach the point where the remaining 
eligible land is more profitable to retain as cultivated land; and 2) due to frequent 
redistributions of agricultural land in rural areas (Jacoby et al. 2002), the total land area 
cultivated by each household changes over time, and a decrease in land conversion could be 
due lower availability of crop land resulting from a recent land redistribution.   
 
Figure 2 plots households’ average annual underpayment, as a percent of the payment 
specified in their contracts, from 1999 to 2004.
9 There is a clear upward trend in the first four 
years and a downward trend in the last two years. As discussed earlier, around 2002 and 2003 
was the end of the five-year pilot phase (experimental period) of the programme. Treating the 
time period around 2002 and 2003 as a hypothetical ending point, that is the end of period 2 
in the reputation game discussed above, the data in Figures 1 and 2 match the game theoretic 
prediction: the likelihood of cheating behaviour generally increases, and the likelihood of 
participation decreases, toward the end of the game. In other words, the more uncertainty 
about the future, the less likely that farmers continue to participate in the programme.  
 
Figure 3 shows grain underpayment and cash underpayment separately. Overall, there was an 
upward trend from 1999 to 2002 and a downward trend after that. Interestingly, in 2004 the 
(average) grain underpayment was negative, so that farmers’ grain payments were overpaid. 
There are two explanations for this: 1) farmers received delayed grain payments in addition to 
their current grain payments in 2004; or (2) cash payments were replaced by the grain 
payments. Both are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Xu et al. 2010) that suggest that 
grain subsidies are paid more often than cash subsidies.  
 
To further investigate the payment inequality issue, we use the data that collected separately 
at the village level, mostly from the village accountant records to calculate the payment that 
village received from the next higher level government. Figure 4 is a plot of village underpaid 
cash amount overlaid with the household underpaid cash amount. One finds that the 
underpaid cash subsidy at the household level is almost 10 percent higher than the village 
level underpaid proportion. Although this could due to either side of the faulty recording or 
reporting, if the individual household sample is truly randomly selected, the gap between 
village and household should motivate further exploration on the way the subsidy is being 
distributed within each village.      
 
Table 3 provides information on subsidy payments that compare ‘elite’ households with other 
farmers. Elite households are defined as households with at least one member who either 
works for the local administration or is a communist party member. This ‘elite group’ is, in 
general, less likely to be underpaid its cash payments. In particular, the difference of cash 
                                                 
9 The total value of the subsidy is calculated by adding the cash payment to the monetary value of the grain 
payment. The value of the grain payment is calculated using separate market prices for different types of grains.   12
payments between these two groups increases significantly in 2002 and almost doubles in 
2004. The difference of the total underpayment between these two groups is similar to the 
underpayment in cash amount for 1999 and 2002, but not for 2004.
10 A simple t-test of the 
difference between these two groups’ means indicates that they are significantly different 
from each other (10 percent level).    
 
Next, consider whether farmers change their perception of the programme based on subsidy 
shortfalls, and whether this becomes a major determinant of their future participation. The 
answer, summarized from the survey questions regarding participants’ and non-participants’ 
perspectives on the programme, shows that, in both 2002 and 2004, the number of payment-
related negative comments accounted for 37 per cent to 44 per cent of all other negative 
comments regarding issues, such as technical support levels, programme extensions, and 
management issues. The survey also asked non-participants why they did not participate in 
the programme. The survey shows increasing worry among non-participants about payment 
shortfalls, delayed payment, and unequal payment distribution, based on observing 
participating households. This suggests that observing past government performance does 
affect farmers’ decisions about whether to participate in the programme, as has been 
mentioned in the previous literature.
11   
5  Empirical identification and estimation 
This section presents estimates of the determinants of which households are underpaid, and 
the impact of underpayment on household participation decisions, 
5.1  Who is underpaid? The evidence from households  
Recall the assumption in the theoretical model that the local government may pay different 
farmers different subsidy amounts. Recall also that the probability of a farmer’s participation 
in each period is partly determined by how much he or she has been paid previously, and that 
an O-type government decides when to play a mixed strategy by comparing the farmer’s 
updated posterior belief with the probability threshold in each period. Thus farmers’ 
characteristics determine, in part, how much they are paid. Appendix 3 provides the summary 
statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Let  Uijt denote the subsidy underpayment for household i in village j at time t. The 
explanatory variables include household i’s characteristics, denoted by Zijt, and characteristics 
of the household’s land, denoted by Lijt. Finally, let νj be unobserved village-specific 
characteristics and εijt be household-specific unobserved characteristics. The model to be 
estimated is: 
Uijt = αZijt + σLijt + νj + εijt 
                                                 
10 The reasons for focusing on cash underpayments are: (1) the cash subsidy has a relatively clear standard: 
RMB300 per hectare per year, but grain payments depend on area; (2) in general, farmers value cash payments 
more than grain payments; and (3) to partially account for the fact that some cash payments are replaced by the 
grain payments. 
11 See Grosjean and Kontoleon (2007).   13
To explore the richness of the data on land conversion and subsidy payments, both cross-
sectional results for 2003 and 2004, as well as panel results are presented.  
2003 and 2004 cross-sectional results 
The first set of regression results uses the 2003 and 2004 recall data, which were collected in 
2005. This is done separately for six dependent variables: farmers’ self-reported 
underpayment amounts in cash and grain, their percentage amounts, and the sum of these two 
variables and its percentage amount.
12 The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Overall, the estimates that have grain payments as the dependent variable yield coefficients 
that have lower statistical significance than those for the other dependent variables. This may 
reflect the fact that some local governments replace cash subsidies with grain payments to 
extract additional monetary profits. If this is the case, the coefficients estimates from 
regressions with either cash or grain as the dependent variable could be biased, but in an 
opposite direction, due to the correlation between measurement error and any of the 
explanatory variables, which is very likely. Furthermore, if cash payments are replaced by the 
grain payments in some villages, and villages’ propensity to do so is unrelated to the 
explanatory variables, this would produce random measurement error in the dependent 
variable, and so lead to less precise estimates. In contrast, the results for cash and total value 
of underpayment yield similar, and statistically significant, findings.  
 
All regressions in Table 4 use a village level fixed-effects specification. The results show that 
households with steeply sloped land are more likely to receive their payments, which is not 
surprising because the programme gives priority to steeply sloped land. Interestingly, 
households with communist party members are significantly less likely to be underpaid. A 
household with one more communist party member receives RMB358 (US$31) more in cash 
payment and RMB 442 (US$63) more in total subsidy value. However, except for one grain 
payment regression there is no significant effect of having a family member working in the 
local administration.  
1999-2004 results with constructed underpayment variables 
Several additional features of the underpayment variables in these regressions are worth 
noting. For each of the three variables (underpaid in cash, in grain or total value), about half 
of the observations equal zero. Moreover, for households who experienced payment 
shortfalls, those shortfalls vary widely. To check the robustness of the results, several 
transformations of the dependent variable were used. Of those, the log(U) transformation (or 
-log(-U), if U < 0, or 0 if U = 0) best fits the data. 
 
As a robustness check, and to confirm the findings from Table 4, Tables 5a and 5b report 
results from both an OLS and a village level fixed-effect model that use five years of data 
with the constructed underpayment amount as the dependent variable
13. Table 5a uses the log 
of annual underpayment value as the dependent variable, while Table 5b uses the log of 
accumulated underpayment as the dependent variable. Using the accumulated underpayment 
variable should reduce the impact of short-term delays in payments, so this variable focuses 
on underpayments that will probably never be paid. 
                                                 
12 The grain payment is monetized by multiplying the grain amount by the market price for that type of grain. 
13 The correlation between constructed underpayment and self-reported underpayment in 2003 and 2004 is 40-
60 per cent.   14
 
The log annual underpayment results in Table 5a use both OLS (columns 1 and 2) and village 
fixed-effects (columns 3, 4 and 5) specifications. In general, the results in Table 5a are 
similar to those in Table 4. Columns 1 and 3 exclude the effect of having household members 
working for the village, focusing on the effect of having a Communistic Party member. 
Results suggest that, with or without the effect of having village administration workers in 
the household, there is a strong negative effect of the number of household members who are 
Communist Party members on households’ payment shortfalls. Yet the results from columns 
2, 4 and 5 suggest that having household members work for the local government has little 
effect on subsidy receipt. 
 
The results in Table 5a also show a strong positive effect of household non-agricultural 
income on underpayment, which may reflect a distributive priority that some villages follow: 
households with lower income get paid more, or at least have a shorter delay. This priority 
may also explain why households with more educated heads receive smaller payments, but 
this is significant only for the two OLS specifications. The coefficient estimates on ‘slope 
land’ variables support the results in Table 4 that having more sloped land decreases a 
household’s subsidy underpayment.  
 
The dependent variable used in Table 5b, log accumulated underpayment, focuses more on 
real subsidy shortfalls rather than on short-term payment delays. Results are consistent across 
all specifications in Table 5b. Both ‘education of head’ and ‘total land owned’ have 
significant negative impacts on subsidy receipt. Again, the significant impact of ‘having a 
communist party member’ suggests that such households, who seem to have special status in 
the community, not only get their subsidies on time but are also more likely to eventually get 
their subsidies.  
 
The young labourer variable represents households’ alternative economic opportunities. Not 
surprisingly, having more economic alternatives reduces the probability that a household 
receives its subsidy, perhaps due to a village’s distributional rule. Interestingly, the 
percentage of land in either category 2 or 3 does not affect a household’s accumulated 
underpayment. Thus the steepness of a household’s land may have a large effect on whether 
payments are delayed (Table 5a) but is not a major determinant of permanent subsidy 
shortfalls.  
5.2  The reputation effect 
The reputation game between farmers and the local administration generated three testable 
implications regarding programme participation and local governments’ payment behaviour 
conditional on farmers’ participation choices. First, if future uncertainty is assumed to 
increase over time (i.e. αt is a decreasing function of T - t), then over time farmers would start 
to randomize the ‘participate and ‘not participate’ strategies and eventually will drop out of 
the programme toward the end of the game. This is because the threshold belief for farmers to 
participate in the programme is an increasing function of future uncertainty, which is 
predicted by a mixed-strategy PBE. Second, if the government’s reputation is based on the 
past experiences of farmers’ concerning their subsidy payment, one should expect a negative 
relationship between the amount of land currently converted and past underpayment. Third, if 
some farmers are paid more than others, the favoured group should have more incentive to 
participate in the programme.    15
 
Recall that the theoretical model implies that the equation for the probability of a farmer’s 
participation in the programme can be written as: 
Pt ＞Pt* = F(πat,, (1 – δt-1)S, α(T – t)) 
where πat is the opportunity cost to participate in the programme and a negative coefficient 
should be expected; (1 – δt-1)S is the lagged underpayment amount with an individual specific 
partial payment parameter, δt-1; and the uncertainty parameter α, which is a function of (T - t). 
A linearized specification of the amount of land currently converted, as a function of the 
household’s previous underpayments, household and village specific characteristics, and a 
time effect, is:  
 P′ijt = β1Xijt + β2Uij,t-1 + β3(T – t) + θij + νj + εijt 
where P′ijt is the proportion of household i’s land in village j that is newly converted at time t; 
Xijt is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables that describe household i’s economic, 
political and social status, such as household income, number of household members who are 
party members, and number of household members who work for the local government; and 
Uij,t-1 = (1 – δij,t-1)S is the proportion of the subsidy payment that household i did not receive 
at t-1. Assuming that future uncertainty increases over time, participation is a function of 
timing, which is the years remaining before the end of the experimental period (in 2003), so 
the regression equation includes a time variable, 2003-t. Finally, θij + νj + εijt is a composite 
error term, where θij is a time-invariant fixed effect on programme participation for 
household i who lives in village j, νj  is a village fixed effect that captures local government 
characteristics,
14 and εijt  represents household-specific time varying unobserved 
characteristics. 
 
The previous underpayment, Uij,t-1, is the main variable of interest. Recall that the theoretical 
model shows that there are two distinct factors, corruption and poor programme planning, 
that can reduce farmers’ incentive to participate. Unfortunately, the available survey data do 
not provide sufficient information to separately identify the impacts of corruption and of 
policy design and implementation, both of which lead to the policy uncertainty regarding 
programme longevity. 
 
There are two estimation problems that can lead to inconsistent estimates. First, unobserved 
household characteristics (θij), such as differences in land converting preferences, risk 
aversion and discounting, are likely to be correlated with the regressors, such as 
underpayment, total crop land and other household income. A household fixed effects 
specification is used to address this problem. The regression also includes year effects to 
capture the average impact of changes in national policies that may have affect all households 
similarly in a given year. 
 
The second estimation problem is that, even after controlling for time invariant household 
fixed effects, some time-varying household characteristics, such as a household’s ability to be 
involved in local government decision making, or efforts households make to lobby local 
administrators, may jointly affect both payment shortfalls and programme participation. More 
specifically, consistent estimation using a fixed-effects specification requires that neither (Xijt 
                                                 
14 The village-level fixed-effects are irrelevant once household fixed effects are used.   16
-  ij X ) nor (Uijt -  ij U ) is correlated with (εijt -  ij ε ). But this is unlikely to be true. In particular, 
village officials change from time to time (they are either newly elected by villagers or 
appointed by the upper level government), and joining the Party or getting more of one’s 
subsidy payment may depend on special connections that some households have with specific 
village officials. Thus the empirical analysis combines a household-fixed effect specification 
with instrumental variables. 
 
Turn next to the instrumental variables. The first is the average survival rate of the tree 
seedlings the household planted, to instrument the underpayment variable over time. The idea 
is that the GFG programme has a system to monitor newly planted trees, and their survival 
rate should exceed a certain level; if not, the subsidy payment will be either reduced or not 
paid. Note that the local forest department, not the village government, conducts this 
monitoring so any ‘special relationship’ between the village government and some farmers 
should not play a role in this monitoring. One may argue that the survival rate is also 
endogenous in that household effort, or its ‘talent’ for growing trees, may be correlated with 
other regressors. Yet most types of the trees planted under the programme require less skill 
and less maintenance, so the survival rate depends more on exogenous growing conditions 
such as temperature and rainfall. Therefore the household average tree seedling survival rate 
is correlated with the underpayment variable, but should not otherwise be related to the land 
conversion rate in the next time period. 
 
To further explore the household underpayment variable, lagged village underpayment is 
used as the second (excluded) instrumental variable. Recall the delayed announcement case 
of the theoretical model; the impact of corruption is combined with the impact of policy 
uncertainty due to bad programme planning. Yet the household survey data provide 
information only on household underpayment history without further explanations of the 
underpayment. Since delayed announcement could cause some earlier converted land to 
become ineligible for the subsidy, this type of the ineligible early conversion may not be 
counted in the current programme budget which implies this part of the subsidy should not be 
received by the village administration as well. Thus village level underpayment
15 was more 
likely due to programme planning issues rather than corruption. In particular, if corruption 
does not exist, all of the subsidy received by the village should be used for farmers’ subsidy 
payments. Therefore the lagged village underpayment variable should be closely correlated 
with household underpayment, but does not otherwise affect household programme 
participation. Still, one could argue that village underpayments may be correlated with some 
unobserved village characteristics that eventually directly affect farmers’ land conversion 
behaviour. For this reason, further tests are needed. 
 
Tables 6a and 6b report several estimates of Equation (2) using ‘proportion of converted 
land’ as the dependent variable. Those in Table 6a use ‘lag proportion of annual 
underpayment’ and those in Table 6b use ‘lag accumulated proportion of underpayment’ as 
explanatory variables to distinguish the impact of delayed payments from that of 
                                                 
15 Village-level underpayment amount is calculated the same way as the household’s underpayment: taking the 
difference between the total amount of the subsidy that a village is entitled (based on the total amount of the 
land converted at village level) and the amount actually received from the next higher level government.   17
underpayment.
16 In both tables, all regressions include household fixed effects, and the last 
columns also use instrumental variables.  
 
In Table 6a, the first column tests the hypothesis that farmers converted less land toward the 
hypothetical end of the programme (around 2003). The estimated coefficient on the ‘2003-t’ 
variable shows a significant negative impact on the percentage of newly converted land, 
which is consistent with the theory. Yet other interpretations could explain this negative time 
trend. For example, farmers may worry that their land may be redistributed if they do not 
participate early on in the programme. If these concerns involve only household time 
invariant characteristics, the fixed-effects specification implies that the coefficient on ‘2003-
year’ should reflect an average overall farmers’ time preference for land conversion; only 
unobservable household characteristics that determine farmers’ conversion behaviour and 
vary over time lead to bias. Another interpretation is that the land belonging to each 
household, in particular its sloped land that meets the GFG programme’s standard is limited, 
and therefore less and less land will be converted over time. Also, farmers may first convert 
relatively low productivity land, and once all poor quality land is enrolled, they stop adding 




To further investigate these possibilities, the regressions add two explanatory variables, 
‘Total Converted Area’, the accumulated sum of land converted since 1999, and ‘Total 
Available Agricultural Land’, the total crop land that a household controls (excluding 
converted land) to examine whether the participation is limited by the total amount of land in 
the household.
18 The results for these two variables in Table 6a indicate that: (1) The more a 
household has converted land in previous years, the more it converts in the current year; and( 
2) the more land the household controls, the less land it converts (0.5-0.7 per cent for every 
10 mu more land controlled). These results may reflect households preferences for land 
conversion and crop production; some households may have less interest in crop production, 
so they continue converting their land every year, while other households have more 
household labour and crop production expertise and so prefer cultivating, and usually have 
more land than others. If households are limited by their total land holdings, after adding 
these two variables the coefficient on the time trend (‘2003-t’) should have no significant 
effect on land conversion. However, that is significantly positive in all regressions. 
 
The regressions in columns 5, 6 and 7 add variables indicating the percentage of remaining 
land that is steeply sloped (category 2 or 3).19 The results indicate that conversion is more 
likely when a household’s remaining land is more steeply sloped. Most importantly, the 
coefficient on the variable ‘2003-t’ remains positive and significant, which implies that the 
alternative interpretation that households’ land constraints discourages them from converting 
land is, at least, not the only explanation. 
 
                                                 
16 Regressions were also run including both ‘lag underpayment’ and ‘lag accumulated underpayment’. 
Although the signs of the coefficients do not change, all estimates become insignificant. This is probably due to 
these two variables’ high correlation. 
17 ‘Good land’ refers to land that can produce an economic benefit similar to or higher than the GFG subsidy 
payment. 
18 As households convert new land every year, these two variables will vary over time. 
19 This variable differs from those in Tables 4, 5a and 5b, in that it excludes the plots that were previously 
converted.   18
The regressions in columns 5, 6 and 7 control for households’ crop income, non-agricultural 
employment and number of young labourers to control for economic activities that could 
affect households’ preferences to convert land, but none of these factors significantly affects 
land conversion20.  
 
The estimation results in Table 6b are consistent with those in Table 6a, although the 
coefficients on ‘lag accumulated proportion of underpayment’ focus more on the impact of 
real payment shortfalls rather than a payment delay. All coefficient estimates, using either 
annual underpayment or accumulated underpayment, are negative and highly significant. 
Thus the larger the subsidy shortfall that a household experienced, the less likely that it would 
convert more land in later years. Moreover, since estimates based on the annual accumulated 
underpayment data are less likely to be influenced by delayed payments, the coefficient 
estimates of accumulated underpayment should be a better measure of the impact of real 
underpayment. In fact, the underpayment coefficient estimates from annual underpayments 
are larger than those for accumulated underpayments. This suggests that delayed payments 
also discourage farmers. 
 
Columns FE(2) - FE(5) in both tables show regressions that include two noteworthy 
variables: (1) the number of party members in the household; and (2) the number of 
household members who work for the local government.21 After controlling for other factors, 
having party members has a significant positive effect on the amount of newly converted 
land, and this effect is consistent across all four columns. Each party member increases the 
land conversion rate by 0.13, to 0.17. In contrast, the coefficients on household members 
working for village government do not have significant effects on land conversion. Also, the 
absolute values of the reputation estimates, ‘lag underpayment’ and ‘lag accumulated 
underpayment’, do not change and remain significant.  
 
To overcome the second identification problem, that changes in ‘underpayment’ over time 
may be correlated with some unobservable, time-varying household characteristics, the last 
columns in Tables 6a and 6b show regressions in which the underpayment variable is 
instrumented. Recalling the discussion in the previous section, the two instruments are 
‘average tree seedling survival rate’ and ‘village-level underpayment’. While it may seem 
unusual to have village level underpayment be an instrument variable for a household level 
variable in a fixed-effect specification, note that the village annual payment shortfall does 
change over time.  
 
For these ‘IV FE’ estimates, the impacts of underpayment remain negative, although the 
estimate using accumulated underpayment (Table 6b) loses statistical significance. The 
coefficient on the Party member variable shows an even stronger positive impact on 
programme participation: households with a Party member convert 20 per cent to 30 per cent 
more agricultural land into forest land. In addition, having someone who works for the village 
also has a significant positive effect on land conversion in both regressions. Note finally that 
                                                 
20 There may have been other policy changes in these areas at the same time. For example, the land 
reform/tenure policy that was introduced around 2004 could provide an incentive for households to keep their 
land for more profitable future purposes rather than convert to the GFG programme. Unfortunately, the data 
used here contain no information on this programme, so this possibility cannot be tested. 
21 Note that a fixed-effects model removes all the information that does not vary across different time periods. 
In the sample, there are 30 households who have either increased or decreased the number of party members 
from 1999 to 2004, and about 20 households that report a change in the number working for the local 
government. Only five households have both types of changes.   19
a Hausman test indicates that the IV estimates are preferred,22 and an overidentification test 
does not reject the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.23  
One a more negative note, a weak instruments test indicates that weak instruments may be a 
serious problem for the estimates in Table 6a, but this is less of a problem in Table 6b.24  
5.3  Privilege versus information  
Summarizing the results from Tables 6a and 6b, having at least one party member in the 
household raises the probability of getting the full subsidy. This is consistent with the result 
that such households have a strong interest in participating in the programme. It is also 
consistent with the theoretical model: if the local government can treat households 
differently, based on δ, (the partial payment parameter), households with a higher δ or closer 
connections to the local government will tend to participate more. In other words, if political 
influence assures the favoured group’s payment, those groups will have more faith that the 
government is trustworthy and, therefore, have a higher probability of participating. Although 
the theoretical model did not address this point, an alternative interpretation of Party 
members’ particular interest in programme participation could be due to α, a parameter 
representing households’ expectations about the future of the programme. If uncertainty 
about the future has less effect on the favoured groups, or they do not expect the programme 
to end soon, then they should have higher participation rates the rest of the population.    
 
However, it is almost impossible to measure people’s expectations directly. Although the 
empirical analysis has shown that an ‘elite group’ is more likely to receive full payment, one 
can distinguish between these two possibilities by running a similar regression with a smaller 
sample: the households living in villages that gave no payments to anyone in the last time 
period from 1999 to 2004. If the elite group in these villages is still more likely to participate 
in the programme, the only explanation is that they have a different expectation regarding the 
future of the programme. 
 
Table 7 presents estimates that attempt to separate the ‘party member’ effect from the 
‘working in local government’ effect. Despite the small sample size, all other coefficients are 
similar in terms of both sign and significance to those in Table 6a. In particular, the negative 
sign of the village level underpayment coefficient indicates that as the village payment 
shortfall (from upper level government, such as town, city or province) increases, less land is 
converted. However, neither the ‘Party member’ nor the ‘working for local government’ 
variables have a significant influence. This does not support the hypothesis that an ‘elite 
group’ has a different perspective, or private information regarding the programme’s 
continuation. Or in other words, without the advantage of securing payments, the ‘elite 
group’ behaves just as the rest of the households and chooses not to participate. Therefore, 
the alternative hypothesis is that the ‘elite group’ is more likely to participate in the 
programme because its political power provides it higher subsidy payments than those 
received by other households.  
                                                 
22 The p-values from Hausman tests for both ‘lag percentage of underpayment’ and ‘lag percentage of 
accumulated underpayment’ are significant at the 1 percent level (p-value=0.0004 for ‘lag percentage of 
underpayment’ and p-value=0.0000 for ‘lag percentage of accumulated underpayment’). 
23 The over-identification test results: the chi-square statistic (p-value=0.352 for ‘Lag percentage of 
underpayment’ and p-value=0.196 for ‘lag percentage of accumulated underpayment’). 
24 The weak IV test results: f-statistic from regression ‘lag percentage underpayment’ and ‘lag percentage of 
accumulated underpayment’ on the excluded instruments are 1.72 and 5.12, respectively.   20
6 Conclusions 
This paper looks for evidence that reputation regarding previous subsidy payments plays an 
important role in determining farmers’ participation in China’s ‘Grain for Green’ land 
conservation programme. A game theoretic model of the strategic interaction between 
households and local governments was used to explore the causal relationship between 
programme payment shortfalls and subsequent land conversion under the programme. 
Although one cannot directly observe how people make use of reputation, the empirical 
evidence supports the view that reputation or prior experience affects household participation 
in the programme. On average, every 10 percent payment shortfall in a previous time period 
leads to a loss of 0.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent in agricultural land being converted to forest. 
Moreover, uncertainty over the programme’s continuation reinforces the impact of 
programme payment shortfalls, further reducing the participation rate. 
 
The main contribution of the theoretical part in this paper is the extension of the reputation 
game to incorporate uncertainty about the game’s end date, which addresses a policy 
planning issue concerning the ‘Grain for Green’ programme. With this environment, farmers 
will face an additional risk that comes from the local government’s behaviour change 
regarding the future uncertainty. Supported by this theoretic implication, one empirical 
strategy combined instrumental variable estimation with panel data, instrumenting household 
underpayment with tree seedling survival rate and village-level payment information, which 
reflects the upper level governments’ periodic targeting to separately identify the impact of 
corruption from the impact of policy uncertainty regarding programme longevity. The 
regression results showed a strong negative relationship between previous payment shortfalls 
and subsequent land conversion. Moreover, after controlling for variables such as ‘previous 
total converted land’ and ‘total available cropland owned by households’, a negative effect of 
the amount of time left before the end of the programme’s pilot phase suggests that farmers 
are more cautious or less willing to convert land over time, which is consistent with the 
theoretical model. 
 
Household characteristics also affect programme participation. Empirical estimates indicate a 
significantly positive effect of Communist Party membership on the land conversion rate. 
The empirical analysis also investigates the motivation of this ‘elite’ group to participate in 
the programme. After ruling out the possibility of having different expectations regarding the 
programme’s long term continuation, the evidence favours the hypothesis that subsidy 
payment security or priority due to their political position is a likely reason for their high 
participation rates. 
 
Reputation-building is often complicated, so it is reasonable to ask whether people actually 
behave in this way.
25 Assumptions underlying theories of reputation building are hard to 
verify. Yet these results, which are supported by both theory and empirical evidence, provide 
a partial explanation of farmers’ decision-making on land conversion. In general, this paper 
provides insights into how policy design and implementation affect conservation programme 
outcomes. From a policy perspective, finding a relationship between payment shortfalls and 
land conversion rates suggests that improving programme implementation could reduce 
payment shortfalls, delayed payments and payment inequalities, then more agricultural land 
could be converted to forest under this conservation programme. In other words, the 
                                                 
25 See the discussion in Camerer (2003: section 9.2).   21
programme goal of converting 8 million hectares of cropland could have been achieved with 
a much smaller government budget. Therefore, a better understanding of this system will 
allow policy makers to improve the programme to better attain its economic and 
environmental objectives. This case study provides an example of how to estimate the effect 
of the reputation mechanism on the effectiveness of conservation programmes in developing 
countries. It also suggests that rooting out corruption and strengthening the legal enforcement 
of government contracts are keys to achieving effective conservation efforts in developing 
countries. 
 
To our knowledge, there are few experiments on reputation formation in trust games, and 
even fewer empirical studies of the effect on public trustworthiness of previous individual 
experiences in real life situations. While the evidence cannot directly substantiate the process, 
the fact that reputation is important for the outcomes of the GFG programme suggests that it 
may also be important for other public projects. Combining other data sets and looking for 
evidence on the impact of what people have experienced on how they behave in other public 
projects will shed further light on the causal relationship. Future studies should also 
investigate spillover effects from programme participants to non-participants. Descriptive 
statistics show that payment-related issues are noticed not only by programme participants, 
but also by non-participants. If these concerns lead other farmers to avoid participation, the 
reputation effect on the programme outcome could be larger than those estimated in this 
study. 
 
Policy makers should understand the impact of inconsistent programme planning and 
targeting, and of delays in the process due to the complicated top-down programme 
administration. More creative and non-traditional methods should be considered as the 
alternatives, such as educating local communities about carbon markets, providing 
opportunities for partnerships between local farmers and foreign firms, seeking carbon offsets 
or creating space for non-governmental organizations to work with local communities to 
enhance conservation outcomes and monitor local administrators’ conservation efforts.   22
Table 1: Correlation between ‘self-reported amount’ and ‘constructed amount’ 
 Contract  Amount
*, %
  Underpayment Amount, % 
 2003  2004  2003  2004 
Cash Subsidy  45  60  44  63 
Grain Subsidy  67  26  69  26 
Total
**   80  69  60  51 
Note: *The constructed contract amount is calculated based on the formula set by that the programme. **The 
total value is calculated by adding both cash amount and grain amount in kg*1.4 (China’s government uses a 
conversion rate of 1kg of grain=RMB 1.4, Uchida et al. 2005. 
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
 
 
Table 2: Underpaid households versus overpaid households 
Year  Number of underpaid HHs  %  Number of overpaid HHs  % 
1999 79 30 3  1 
2000 167 63  3  1 
2001 203 77 21  8 
2002 239 91 22  8 
2003 195 85 28 12 
2004 160 70 68 30 
Data source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of underpaid households: elite group versus the rest 
  HHs were underpaid in cash, %  HHs were underpaid in total value*, % 
  ‘Elite group’  The others  ‘Elite group’  The others 
1999 21.4  21.5  19.6  22.4 
2002 63.2  68.9  64.5  67.1 
2004 16.5  31.5  41.8  51.9 
Note: *The total value of subsidy underpaid amount is calculated by adding both cash amount and grain amount 
in kg*1.4 (China’s government uses a conversion rate of 1kg of grain=RMB 1.4, Uchida et al. 2005). **The 
demographic information is only available for year 1999, 2002 and 2004.  
Data source: Calculated by the author using GFG household survey data (2003, 2005). 
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Table 4: Who is underpaid? The evidence from households: village fixed-effect (village 
dummy), dependent variable: self-reported underpaid subsidy (2003 and 2004) 
Cash  Cash (%)  Grain  Grain (%)  Total value  Total value (%) 
Head age  -0.009**  -0.017  -0.001  0.003  -0.011**  0.002 
(0.004) (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Head education  0.015  -0.028  0.001  0.011  0.016  0.048 
(0.015) (0.059)  (0.006)  (0.017) (0.018)  (0.033) 
Party member  -0.358**  -0.434*  -0.060  0.093  -0.442**  -0.399* 
(0.143) (0.213)  (0.060)  (0.168) (0.173)  (0.212) 
Village admin workers  0.194  0.900  -0.145*  -0.224  -0.009  0.788 
(0.210) (0.702)  (0.079)  (0.181) (0.256)  (0.824) 
Crop income  0.005  0.071  -0.004  -0.012  -0.001  -0.005 
(1000 rmb)  (0.017)  (0.044)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.057) 
Non-agricultural income  0.001  0.004  0.000  -0.025**  0.001  0.000 
(1000 rmb)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Young labourer  -0.073  -0.022  0.005  -0.107**  -0.065  0.005 
(0.057) (0.112)  (0.016)  (0.042) (0.061)  (0.144) 
Total agri. land  0.032***  0.018  0.017*  0.016  0.056***  0.020* 
(hectare)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.012) (0.020)  (0.011) 
Land in slope land 
category 2 (%)  -0.095*** -0.080**  -0.027* -0.016  -0.133***  -0.057* 
(0.036) (0.038)  (0.015)  (0.017) (0.043)  (0.041) 
Land in slope land 
category 3 (%)  -0.015 -0.046**  -0.020  0.002  -0.044*  -0.032 
(0.014) (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.014) (0.026)  (0.018) 
Constant 0.503  1.144  0.060  0.310  0.588**  -0.312 
(0.244) (0.873)  (0.089)  (0.268) (0.285)  (0.510) 
Observations 263  222  264  94  263  233 
R-squared 0.154  -0.022  0.065  0.133  0.149  -0.028 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Slope 
land category 2: steepness is between 25 degree to 35 degree: category 3: steepness is greater than 35 degree; 
and the omitted slope category is below 25%. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005) 
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Table 5a: Who is underpaid? The evidence from households (2): OLS versus village fixed-
effect, dependent variable: constructed underpayment (1999-2004) with log transformation 
OLS 1  OLS 2  FE 1  FE 2  FE 3 
Head age  0.011  0.012  -0.013  -0.019  -0.011 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Head education  0.106**  0.104**  0.047  0.023  0.041 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.053)  (0.054) 
Party members  -0.993*  -1.061**  -1.314***  -1.471*** 
(0.520) (0.526) (0.496)  (0.501) 
Village admin. workers  0.274  0.338  0.796 
(0.722) (0.689)  (0.682) 
Young  labourer  0.162 0.162 0.103 0.085  0.098 
(0.124) (0.125) (0.129) (0.128)  (0.129) 
Crop  income  -0.017 -0.017 -0.002 -0.001  -0.002 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) 
Non-agricultural  income  0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004* 0.005** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Total agri. land  0.107  0.106  0.183**  0.180**  0.180** 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.081) (0.082)  (0.081) 
Previous converted land  -0.086  -0.084  -0.204**  -0.191**  -0.198** 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.097) (0.096)  (0.097) 
% land in slope land category 2  -3.209*  -3.247*  -4.003**  -4.083**  -4.120** 
(1.729) (1.716) (1.753) (1.682)  (1.729) 
% land in slope land category 3  -1.976  -1.994  -2.436*  -2.474*  -2.481* 
(1.326) (1.325) (1.449) (1.430)  (1.442) 
Constant  -0.096 -0.131  1.225  1.443* 1.111 
(0.817) (0.821) (0.895) (0.847)  (0.893) 
Observations  734 734 734 736  734 
R-squared  0.202 0.201 0.222 0.216  0.223 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Slope 
land category 2: steepness is between 25 degree to 35 degree: category 3: steepness is greater than 35 degree; 
and the omitted slope category is below 25%. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
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Table 5b: Who is underpaid? The evidence from households (2): OLS versus village fixed 
effects, dependent variable: constructed accumulated underpayment (1999-2004) with log 
transformation 
OLS 1  OLS 2  FE 1  FE 2  FE 3 
Head age  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.006 
(0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.014) 
Head  education  0.091** 0.087** 0.094*  0.087*  0.088* 
(0.041) (0.041)  (0.048) (0.050)  (0.049) 
Party members  -1.053**  -1.218**  -1.393***  -1.556*** 
(0.483) (0.506)  (0.449)  (0.453) 
Village admin. workers  0.642  0.269  0.752 
(0.552) (0.581)  (0.580) 
Young labourer  0.238**  0.236**  0.230**  0.244**  0.224** 
(0.115) (0.115)  (0.109) (0.111)  (0.109) 
Crop income  -0.088  -0.089  -0.102  -0.067  -0.097 
(0.100) (0.101)  (0.106) (0.103)  (0.105) 
Non-agricultural income  0.008  0.007  0.002  0.000  0.000 
(0.019) (0.019)  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.016) 
Total agri. land  0.078  0.077  0.135**  0.129**  0.133** 
(0.050) (0.050)  (0.055) (0.054)  (0.054) 
Previous converted land  0.077*  0.082*  -0.039  -0.009  -0.034 
(0.044) (0.044)  (0.049) (0.050)  (0.049) 
% land in slope land category 2  0.469  0.380  0.619  -0.184  0.509 
(1.309) (1.313)  (1.373) (1.421)  (1.375) 
% land in slope land category 3  0.193  0.155  -0.262  -0.472  -0.309 
(0.693) (0.691)  (0.800) (0.773)  (0.793) 
Constant 0.848  0.775  0.701  0.450  0.602 
(0.770) (0.765)  (0.812) (0.888)  (0.813) 
Observations 754  754  754  756  754 
R-squared 0.258  0.259  0.279  0.263  0.280 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Slope 
land category 2: steepness is between 25 degree to 35 degree: category 3: steepness is greater than 35 degree; 
and the omitted slope category is below 25%. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
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Table 6a: Reputation effect (HH FE versus IV-FE) with ‘lag % of HH underpayment’  
Time Effect  FE 1  FE 2  FE 3  FE 4  FE 5  FE IV 
Last year converted area  -0.200***  -0.136***  0.004  -0.136***  -0.004  -0.029  0.112 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.062) (0.019) (0.061) (0.061) (0.116) 
Total  converted  area  0.317*** 0.444*** 0.165*** 0.444*** 0.247*** 0.273***  0.522 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.059) (0.022) (0.072) (0.073) (0.423) 
Total  available  agricultural  land    -0.020*  -0.053*** -0.076*** -0.053*** -0.070*** -0.070***  -0.158** 
  (0.012) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.076) 
2003-year  0.056*** 0.052*** 0.029*** 0.052***  0.021*  0.022*  -0.018 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) 
Lag % of underpayment* (1)    -0.110***  -0.149***  -0.110***  -0.172***  -0.175***  -0.270** 
    (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.131) 
HH party member (2)      0.135**  0.013*  0.132***  0.153***  0.225*** 
      (0.058) (0.007) (0.044) (0.047) (0.086) 
HH members works for village administration (3)        0.007  0.053  -0.083  0.191* 
        (0.036) (0.054) (0.077) (0.106) 
(1)*(2)        -0.055   
        (0.070)   
(1)*(3)        0.262**   
        (0.103)   
Crop  income       0.003  0.003  0.030** 
       (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
Non-agri.  income       0.001  0.001  -0.002 
       (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
% land left in slope category 2
(1)         -0.138*  -0.149*  -0.336** 
       (0.079)  (0.078)  (0.168) 
% land left in slope category 3           0.060*  0.064*  0.124 
       (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.081) 
Observations  1261  1198  485 485 482 482 364 
Notes: Dependent variable: HH annual percentage of newly converted land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%. The excluded IV for * include average HH’s survival rate of tree seedlings and lagged village underpayment. 
(1)This percentage excludes the land that has been already 
enrolled in the SLCP programme. All the regressions also control for ‘non-agri. employment’ and ‘number of young labourer’, but the estimators are not significant. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
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Table 6b: Reputation effect (HH FE versus IV-FE) with ‘lag % of HH accumulated 
underpayment’ 
  FE 1  FE 2  FE 3  FE 4  FE 5  FE IV 
Last year converted area  -0.278***  -0.129*  -0.277***  -0.113*  -0.119*  0.097 
  (0.017) (0.068) (0.017) (0.066) (0.068) (0.197) 
Total converted area  0.500***  0.350***  0.503***  0.310***  0.356***  0.169 
  (0.022) (0.069) (0.022) (0.080) (0.083) (0.493) 
Total available agricultural land  -0.015  -0.026  -0.016  -0.020  -0.020  -0.016 
  (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) 
2003-year 0.041***  0.023**  0.041***  0.030**  0.028**  0.019 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) 
Lag percentage of accumulated 
underpayment* (1)  -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.077***  -0.089 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.077) 
HH party member (2)    0.171***  0.031*  0.175***  0.158***  0.371*** 
    (0.063) (0.016) (0.047) (0.050) (0.121) 
HH members works for village 
administration (3)     -0.018  -0.008  0.045  0.219* 
      (0.035) (0.058) (0.080) (0.132) 
(1)*(2)         0.017**   
         (0.008)  
(1)*(3)         -0.022  
         (0.020)  
Crop income        0.000  0.001  -0.001 
        (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) 
Non-agri. income        0.003**  0.003*  0.006 
        (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
% land left in slope category 2         -0.100  -0.091  -0.133 
        (0.069) (0.069) (0.123) 
% land left in slope category 3         0.066**  0.057*  0.138 
        (0.032) (0.032) (0.121) 
Observations  1261 494 494 491 491 370 
Notes: Dependent variable: HH annual percentage of newly converted land. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The excluded IV for * include 
average HH’s survival rate of tree seedlings and lagged village underpayment. 
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Table 7: Privilege or information, sample: villages without any subsidy payment in t-1, 
dependent variable: proportion of converted land (pooled cross section OLS with 
village dummy) 
Variable 1  2  3  4 
Last year converted area  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12 
(0.073) (0.075)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
Total converted area  0.52***  0.53***  0.53***  0.52*** 
(0.14) (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Total available land  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 
(0.16) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
2003-year 0.006  0.005  0.007  0.005 
(0.012) (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
HH Lag underpayment (1)  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13*** 
(0.045) (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
Village Lag underpayment (3)  -0.002  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 






HH members working for village admin. (4)  -0.23 
(0.35) 
(4)*(1)  -0.14 
(0.11) 
(4)*(3)  -0.002 
(0.002) 
N 335  335  335  335 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
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Figure 1: Annual average conversion rate (1999-2004)  
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual underpayment ratio: including both cash and grain payments 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005).   30
 
Figure 3: Annual underpayment ratio: underpaid cash versus underpaid grain 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
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Underpaid cash (percentage): village vs. household
The percentage underpaid cash:  villages The percentage underpaid cash: household
 
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG data (2003, 2005). 
 
 
   31
Appendix 1 
Proof for proposition 3 
The proof will verify the ‘Sequential Rationality’ and ‘Bayesian Beliefs’ under the 
definition of PBE. 
(1) Player F 
(1.1) In period 1, choosing  1 1 =
D q if  ; 1 1
∗ ≥
D D β β  otherwise  0 2 =
D q  . 
For
∗ ∗ ≥ >
D D D
1 2 1 β β β  
26, the O-type chooses  1 1 , =
D
O γ  since  , 2 1
∗ >
D D β β  so does H-type. 
The best response for farmer is:  , 1 1 =
D q  ‘participate’. 
 
For
∗ ∗ ≥ >
D D D
1 1 2 β β β , following the same logic in the previous propositions, that the 
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D ), the expected payoff of choosing  1 1 =
D q  is greater than 
a π , which is the payoff of  0 1 =
D q  strategy. Hence  1 1 =
D q  is the best response in this 




1 β , player F is indifferent between ‘participate’ or ‘no 
participate’, anything is the best response including  1 1 =






1 β , the expected payoff from ‘participate’ is: 
a
F e participat EV π < ) ( 1 . Thus, the best response for player F is:  , 0 1 =
D q  ‘No 
participation’ in this case. 
(1.2) In period 2, choosing  1 2 =
D q  if
∗ >
D D
2 2 β β ;  S
C D q ) 1 ( 2 1 δ − − =  if 
∗ =
D D
2 2 β β ; and  0 2 =
D q  
if   . 2 2
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27, both O-type and H-type will play  / i,2
D  1,i  O,H  follows 
the equilibrium strategy profile above. Therefore, the best response for player F is to 
participate: 1 2 =
D q . 
                                                 
26 It is easy to show that  ∗ ∗ ≥
" "
1 2 β β  with  . 1 0 < − < δ
π
S
a   





3 β β  under the parameter assumptions.   32
For , 2 2 3
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D D . Therefore the best response is: ‘ 1 2 =
D q if  ; 2 2
∗ >
D D β β  and 
0 2 =
D q   if 
∗ <
D D

















D D leads to the expected 
payoff of participation to be exactly equal to a π . This means the player F is indifferent 
between ‘participate’ and ‘no participate’. Anything is a best response, including 
. 1 ) 1 ( 2 S
C D q δ − − =   
(1.3) In period three, choosing ‘ 1 3 =
D q  if the updated belief
∗ >
D D









− − ∗ = if  
∗ =
D D
3 3 β β ; and  0 3 =
D q  if 
∗ <
D D
3 3 β β .’ 
 
As this is the last period, knowing O-type will play ‘cheat’ and H-type will pay, the 
expected payoff which takes into account of the possibility that the game may end after 
it entered is: 
a
D D D D D D or S S S S π β δ α δ α β δ β α < > ∗ − − + − = − ∗ + ∗ − 3 3 3 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( )] 1 ( )[ 1 (  
when . 3 3
∗ < >
D D or β β  In particular, when , 3 3
∗ =
D D β β  player F is indifferent between 










− − ∗ =  ‘. 
 
The above strategy plan, therefore, is player F’s best response. 
 
(2) Player G 
For player G, note all the payoffs and the mixed-strategy probabilities for player F to 
participate in period 2 and 3 are exactly same as in the ‘early announcement’ case. In 
fact, changing the timing of the announcement does not affect player Gs’ situation, 
therefore, the proof remains same as the proof of player G’s equilibrium strategies in 
proposition (4). 
 
We have shown that both players’ strategies are best responses in all three periods given 
their beliefs, and that beliefs are updated with Bayes’ Rule. Therefore these strategies 
constitute a PBE. (QED) 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive statistics: comparison of household characteristics between participating 
households and non-participating households 
Sample Participants  Non-Participants 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Demographic variables:                                                
   Head age  46.82  11.50  47.35  12.16 
Head education  4.73  3.36  4.63  3.70 
Household size  4.90  1.71  4.58  1.43 
No. of communist party members  0.16  0.40  0.24  0.47 
No. of village administration workers  0.08  0.28  0.06  0.24 
Income sources: (RMB)         
Crop income  854.94  1705.56  1451.33  3979.85 
Non-agriculture income  2152.91  9339.81  2810.90  6706.94 
Household labour:          
No. of young labourer  2.28  1.25  2.09  1.08 
No. of agricultural workers  1.06  0.92  0.99  0.92 
Land information:         
Total agricultural land (Mu)  14.4  12.5  10.9  12.0 
Average distance from home (meter)  924.5  668.4  668.4  603.6 
Average distance from road  770.7  964.7  687.7  1193.5 
Average distance from ditch  862.5  1674.0  540.8  1144.7 
Percentage of irrigated land  14.5%  29.7%  19.7%  35.1% 
Percentage of paddy land  9.6%  25.1%  9.6%  25.0% 
Percentage of land with low productivity  41.8%  31.7%  39.1%  32.2% 
Percentage land in slope category 2  15.2%  22.1%  17.2%  26.3% 
Percentage land in slope category 3  46.2%  34.9%  35.1%  37.5% 
Note: *The total number of participating households is 266 for 3 years, therefore N=798. The total number 
of non-participating households is 86. 
Source: Calculated by the authors using GFG household survey data (1999, 2003, 2005). 
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